When to Use
- Android APK analysis and exploitation
- iOS application pentesting
- Mobile app security assessment
- Bypassing security controls (SSL pinning, root detection)
- Testing mobile-specific vulnerabilities
When NOT to Use
- Backend API testing — use
testing-apis - Deep native binary reversing — use
analyzing-binaries - Analyzing a malicious app — use
analyzing-malware - Source code is available — use
auditing-code-for-vulnerabilities
Check the Framework Before Anything Else
jadx returning almost nothing does not mean the app is obfuscated — it usually means the logic is not in the dex at all. Run this first; it decides which skill you should be in.
unzip -l target.apk | rg 'libflutter|libapp\.so|index\.android\.bundle|libhermes|global-metadata|libil2cpp|Assembly-CSharp'| Marker | Framework | Skill |
|---|---|---|
libflutter.so, libapp.so, flutter_assets/ | Flutter / Dart | reversing-flutter-apps |
index.android.bundle, libhermes.so, main.jsbundle | React Native | reversing-react-native-apps |
global-metadata.dat, libil2cpp.so, Assembly-CSharp.dll | Unity | reversing-unity-il2cpp |
libmonodroid.so, assemblies.blob, libxamarin-app.so | Xamarin / .NET MAUI | reversing-xamarin-maui |
classes*.dex with real application packages | Native Android | continue here |
Two framework symptoms are worth naming, because they waste the most time when misread: a Flutter app shows no traffic at all in your proxy (it ignores the system proxy and CA store), and a React Native or Unity app shows a near-empty dex with all the logic in assets/.
Three more procedure skills split out of this one, because each needs far more detail than a general assessment can carry:
| Situation | Skill |
|---|---|
| App exits on a rooted device, or dies when Frida attaches | bypassing-root-jailbreak-detection |
| iOS binary work: FairPlay decryption, Mach-O, class-dump, entitlements | analyzing-ios-binaries |
| Exported components, deep links, URL schemes, content providers | testing-mobile-ipc |
If the proxy fails for any other reason — a TLS handshake alert, or an app that reports a network error with the proxy on — go to bypassing-mobile-pinning before assuming certificate pinning. On Android 7+ the most common cause is that your CA is installed as a user certificate, which apps do not trust by default, and no pinning bypass fixes that.
Android Pentesting
APK Analysis Tools
# Decompile APK
apktool d app.apk -o app_decompiled
# Convert DEX to JAR
d2j-dex2jar app.apk
# View JAR with JD-GUI
jd-gui app-dex2jar.jar
# Automated analysis
mobsf # Mobile Security Framework
jadx app.apk # APK to Java decompilerADB (Android Debug Bridge)
# List devices
adb devices
# Connect over network
adb connect 192.168.1.100:5555
# Install APK
adb install app.apk
# Uninstall
adb uninstall com.package.name
# List packages
adb shell pm list packages
adb shell pm list packages | grep -i "keyword"
# Get APK path
adb shell pm path com.package.name
# Pull APK from device
adb pull /data/app/com.package.name-xxx/base.apk
# Start activity
adb shell am start -n com.package.name/.MainActivity
# View logs
adb logcat
# Shell access
adb shellStatic Analysis
Search for Sensitive Data:
# Extract strings
strings app.apk | grep -i password
strings app.apk | grep -i api
strings app.apk | grep -i token
strings app.apk | grep -i key
# Search in decompiled code
grep -r "password" app_decompiled/
grep -r "http://" app_decompiled/
grep -r "api_key" app_decompiled/Check AndroidManifest.xml:
# Decompile and view
apktool d app.apk
cat app_decompiled/AndroidManifest.xml
# Look for:
# - android:debuggable="true"
# - android:allowBackup="true"
# - Exported activities/services
# - Custom permissions
# - URL schemesDynamic Analysis
Frida (Runtime Instrumentation):
# List running apps
frida-ps -U
# Attach to app
frida -U -n "App Name"
frida -U -f com.package.name
# Load script
frida -U -f com.package.name -l script.js
# Common scripts
# - Bypass SSL pinning
# - Bypass root detection
# - Hook functions
# - Dump memorySSL Pinning Bypass:
// Frida script - Universal SSL pinning bypass
Java.perform(function() {
var TrustManager = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager');
TrustManager.checkServerTrusted.implementation = function() {};
var SSLContext = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.SSLContext');
SSLContext.init.overload('[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;', '[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;', 'java.security.SecureRandom').implementation = function(a,b,c) {
this.init.overload('[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;', '[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;', 'java.security.SecureRandom').call(this, a, null, c);
};
});Root Detection Bypass:
// Frida - Bypass root detection
Java.perform(function() {
var RootClass = Java.use('com.package.name.RootDetection');
RootClass.isRooted.implementation = function() {
return false;
};
});Intercepting Traffic
Burp Suite Setup:
# 1. Install Burp CA certificate
# Download from http://burp:8080 on device
# Install in Settings -> Security -> Install from storage
# 2. Configure proxy
adb shell settings put global http_proxy 192.168.1.100:8080
# 3. For apps with SSL pinning, use Frida bypass
# 4. Clear proxy when done
adb shell settings put global http_proxy :0mitmproxy:
# Start mitmproxy
mitmproxy --listen-port 8080
# Install certificate on device
# http://mitm.it
# Set device proxy to attacker IP:8080Modifying and Repackaging APK
# 1. Decompile
apktool d app.apk -o app_mod
# 2. Modify smali code
# Edit files in app_mod/smali/
# 3. Recompile
apktool b app_mod -o app_modified.apk
# 4. Sign APK
# Generate keystore (first time only)
keytool -genkey -v -keystore my-key.keystore -alias alias_name -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -validity 10000
# Sign
jarsigner -verbose -sigalg SHA1withRSA -digestalg SHA1 -keystore my-key.keystore app_modified.apk alias_name
# Or use uber-apk-signer
java -jar uber-apk-signer.jar -a app_modified.apk
# 5. Install
adb install app_modified.apkCommon Vulnerabilities
Insecure Data Storage:
# Check shared preferences
adb shell
cd /data/data/com.package.name/shared_prefs/
cat *.xml
# Check databases
cd /data/data/com.package.name/databases/
sqlite3 database.db
.tables
SELECT * FROM users;
# Check files
cd /data/data/com.package.name/files/
ls -la
cat *Exported Components:
# List exported activities
adb shell dumpsys package com.package.name | grep -A 20 "Activity"
# Start exported activity
adb shell am start -n com.package.name/.ExportedActivity
# Call exported service
adb shell am startservice -n com.package.name/.ExportedService
# Broadcast to receiver
adb shell am broadcast -a com.package.name.ACTIONInsecure WebView:
# Check for JavaScript enabled
# Look in code for:
webView.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
# Check for addJavascriptInterface
# Can lead to RCE if exposediOS Pentesting
Setup
Jailbreak Tools:
- checkra1n (iOS 12-14)
- unc0ver (iOS 11-14.8)
- Taurine (iOS 14-14.3)
SSH Access:
# Default credentials
ssh root@<device-ip>
# password: alpine
# Change default password!
passwdIPA Analysis
# Extract IPA
unzip app.ipa
# View binary
otool -L Payload/App.app/App
strings Payload/App.app/App
# Class dump
class-dump Payload/App.app/App > classes.txt
# Decrypt binary (on jailbroken device)
frida-ios-dump -u App
# Static analysis with Hopper/GhidraRuntime Analysis
Frida on iOS:
# List apps
frida-ps -Ua
# Attach
frida -U -n "App Name"
frida -U -f com.company.app
# SSL pinning bypass (iOS)
objection -g "App Name" explore
ios sslpinning disableObjection:
# Launch objection
objection -g com.company.app explore
# Common commands
ios info binary
ios hooking list classes
ios hooking search methods MainActivity
ios sslpinning disable
ios jailbreak disable
ios keychain dump
ios nsuserdefaults getFile System Access
# Connect via SSH
ssh root@device-ip
# App data location
cd /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<UUID>/
# Find app UUID
ipainstaller -l # List apps
ls /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/
# Common paths
Documents/
Library/
Library/Preferences/ # plist files
Library/Caches/
tmp/Keychain Access
# Using objection
ios keychain dump
# Manual (requires keychain-dumper on device)
./keychain_dumper
# Specific item
security find-generic-password -s "ServiceName"Common iOS Vulnerabilities
Insecure Data Storage:
# Check plist files
plutil -p Info.plist
# Check UserDefaults
ios nsuserdefaults get
# Check SQLite databases
sqlite3 database.db
.tables
SELECT * FROM sensitive_table;Binary Protections:
# Check for PIE
otool -hv App | grep PIE
# Check for stack canaries
otool -I App | grep stack_chk
# Check for ARC
otool -I App | grep objc_releaseMobile-Specific Attacks
Deep Link Exploitation:
# Android
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d "app://open?param=value"
# iOS
xcrun simctl openurl booted "app://open?param=value"Intent Injection:
# Send malicious intent
adb shell am start -n com.package/.Activity --es "extra_key" "malicious_value"Backup Extraction:
# Android backup
adb backup -f backup.ab com.package.name
# Extract
java -jar abe.jar unpack backup.ab backup.tar
# iOS backup
idevicebackup2 backup --full backup_directoryTools
Android:
- APKTool - Decompile/recompile APKs
- dex2jar - Convert DEX to JAR
- JADX - APK to Java decompiler
- Frida - Dynamic instrumentation
- Objection - Frida-based toolkit
- MobSF - Automated analysis
- Drozer - Android security framework
iOS:
- Frida - Dynamic instrumentation
- Objection - Frida toolkit
- class-dump - Extract class info
- Hopper/Ghidra - Disassemblers
- frida-ios-dump - Decrypt binaries
- iproxy - Forward ports
Quick Testing Workflow
- Static Analysis - Decompile, search strings, analyze manifest/Info.plist
- Install - Install on emulator/device
- Intercept Traffic - Set up Burp/mitmproxy, bypass SSL pinning
- Dynamic Analysis - Use Frida to hook functions, bypass protections
- Test Components - Test exported components, deep links, intents
- Data Storage - Check for insecure data storage in files/DB/keychain
- Repackage - Modify and recompile to test additional scenarios
References
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/mobile-pentesting
- https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg
- https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/